

Candidate 1 evidence

Section 9 – Russia

66. The Russian Civil War that was fought from 1918-1921 tore the country apart. Described by Pipes as being the most dramatic change in Russian society since the Mongol invasions, the war divided the country, primarily between the Red and White forces. The eventual victory by the Reds can be seen as the result of a number of factors, including superior leadership, objective advantages, such as geographical, the greater popular support for the Bolsheviks, the effect of foreign intervention, or the weaknesses of their opponents, mainly their weaker leadership, geographical disadvantages, and lack of popular support. This is a much-debated issue, some, mainly Marxist historians, including EH Carr, and Megan Trudell, have argued that the victory was hard fought by the Reds, whereas others, mainly Liberals, including Pipes, have emphasised the overwhelming advantages the Reds had, especially their geographical superiority. From examining the evidence, it is clear that the Red victory was a combination of factors, but most significantly was their geographical advantages that the Whites could never compete with.

The strong leadership of the Reds arguably helped them win the Civil War. Although Lenin did not provide a strong leadership, the real hero of the Civil War for the Reds was Trotsky. Trotsky's role as a great orator and leader, provided a popular figure for Red troops to put their support behind. His train famously travelled the country, helping to increase morale of soldiers in remote areas. Additionally, the printing press on board his train provided news of the outside world, and Red propaganda, which both helped keep the Red cause alive among its soldiers. Furthermore, Trotsky helped to popularise the use of ex-Tsarist generals for the Red cause, often using terror, by threatening their families. This gave the Red Army a group of highly skilled and trained officers to lead their forces, without which it is doubtful they could have achieved military victory. In addition, Trotsky was the "saviour of Petrograd", fighting to keep the city, when Lenin was willing to give it up to White advances. Due to this, many Red Army veterans praised Trotsky, and Service argues that his contribution made a significant impact on the war. However, some argue that Trotsky's contribution has been overstated. Mawdsley warns of overplaying the Trotsky "myth", while Soviet historians under Stalin, following the official party line, completely erased Trotsky's contribution from history. Overall, Trotsky's contribution was important, but perhaps not critical to the outcome of the war.

The determined, united leadership of the Reds, who were united in their support for their cause, contrasts with the confused, divided leadership of the Whites. The Whites were divided, both ideologically and geographically, particularly in their aims for Russia's future. There was no clear statement of purpose among White leadership, some wanted a return to the Tsarist state, others a constitutional monarchy, others a republic. Moreover, the leadership itself was divided, Denikin, Yudenich, Kornilov, Aleexev and Kolchak did not all communicate and cooperate with one another, e.g. even when Kornilov and Aleexev had offices next to one another, they communicated via messengers due to their hatred of each other. Additionally, the lack of communication prevented the different White forces joining up by the delay of Denikin's Spring Offensive in 1919, which failed to reach Kolchak forces. Admittedly, Kolchak began his own offensive too early, in December, which is further evidence of the failures of the White leadership. One of the only positives of the White leadership was Kornilov, who provided a strong leadership during the early months of the war. Indeed, Figes has argued that his charismatic presence helped form the Volunteer Army, a relatively successful and disciplined group of officers who did have some successes. However, Kornilov was killed in April 1918, meaning his influence was quickly lost. The failures of the Whites leadership meant that the Whites struggled to find support, as no one was entirely sure who or what they were

Section 9 – Russia

fighting for, meaning that the poor leadership of the Whites could be argued to have had a fairly large influence on the war's outcome.

The geographical factor is very significant in determining the reason for Red victory. The Reds' hold of the industrial and most populous areas of Russia gave them a huge advantage over the Whites. Indeed, Mawdsley describes this advantage as an "Aladdin's cave" where the Whites "could only dream of its treasures". The industrial heartlands of Sovdepia gave the Bolsheviks the industry to produce munitions to fight, while control of the railways made the logistics of transporting troops, food, munitions and supplies much easier. Additionally, the population in the Red-controlled areas numbered some 70 million, compared with 20 million in the White controlled areas, giving the Reds a huge advantage in numbers available for conscription and labour. Significant too, was the contiguous nature of the Red territory. The Reds' area was one mass of land, making defending it easier. This compared to the Whites' separate areas of land, often with no significant infrastructure e.g. railways, making it difficult to communicate and form attacks against the Reds. Pipes argues that the geography of the war gave the Reds a "immediate, possible, decisive advantage", that meant the Whites could never have won, with such disadvantageous positions.

The effect of popular support of both sides was essential to the Red win. The Reds' popular support came from their clear policies and aims. The promise of a socialist utopia certainly seemed more inviting than the desire of the Whites to go back to the pre-1917 days of a Tsarist state. Additionally, the Reds were far more willing to compromise to gain support. The highly publicised land decree gave them support among peasants, as well as their continued use of the "Bread, Peace and Land" slogan which tapped into the needs and wants of the peasants. This helped to gain them far greater popular support than the Whites ever enjoyed, and

The Whites' lack of use of minorities could be argued to have hastened their demise, or even contributed to their defeat. Many national minorities, most significantly the Poles, Cossack and Finns would perhaps have been more willing to provide support for the Whites if the Whites had offered a chance of independence. By refusing to compromise, instead echoing the Tsarist state's calls for one indivisible Russia, the Whites lost a valuable opportunity for greater military support, which was much-needed. Furthermore, when the Whites did manage to find some support in a reduced number of Cossacks, this was undermined by the Cossacks' participation in pogroms against the Jews, and looting and plundering of conquered areas. This meant the Whites lost support in these areas, which did not help them overall, and possibly contributed to their defeat. In contrast, the Reds were more willing to forge alliances, using the Black Anarchists very effectively to weaken Denikin's rear, causing critical damage to his attack. As Mawdsley argues, the Red victory was ultimately "a military one" and Whites did not help their already lower numbers by refusing to try to gain support elsewhere. Therefore, this could be seen as an important, but not the most important factor in the Red win.

Finally, the impact of foreign intervention in the war must be examined. Foreign intervention by Allied troops was, at best, fairly ineffective. In addition, the intervention gave the Reds a propaganda coup, meaning they were able to claim they were defending Russia against foreign invaders. Pipes characterises the intervention as "half-hearted and ineffective". Indeed, there was little support among other European forces for a further war, just as the First World War was coming to an end. Numbers of troops sent were fairly minimal and intervention was confused, with Britain initially

Section 9 – Russia

giving their support to Denikin, before realising Kolchak was a better bet. This created an uneven, ineffective intervention and arguably gave the Reds greater help for propaganda than it ever gave the Whites militarily.

In conclusion, the Red victory was the result of many different factors, making it difficult to determine its exact cause. Although the strong leadership of the Reds, particularly Trotsky was important in contrast to the weaknesses of the Whites, the issue of leadership was not the most important factor in determining the outcome of the war. Foreign intervention did little in military sense, only giving the Russian people greater reason to support the Reds, while the White's lack of use of minorities only hurt their military power. Overall, the huge geographical advantage the Reds had can be said to be the main factor, as argued by Mawdsley and Pipes, which meant the Whites never had a chance at victory.

Section 9 – Russia

Part B

70. Source A is useful to some extent as evidence of the problems facing the Provisional Government. Firstly, the source can be considered useful due to its author. Written as part of minutes from a meeting of the Kadets, one of the major parties of the Provisional Government. Those at the meeting would have had first-hand experience of the issues facing the government at this time.

Secondly, the source's purpose helps its usefulness. The meeting seems to have been an overview of the problems facing the PG at this time. This would have given a comprehensive overall picture of the dangers faced, as well as having little reason to over or understate problems in the party itself, as the problems needed to be faced head-on and dealt with.

Thirdly, the source was written in August 1917. This is significant as it was post July Days, during which armed protests exploded onto the streets, and the Provisional Government came close to falling, which increases the source's usefulness as those in the meeting will be well aware of the significant problems faced by the Provisional Government.

Additionally, the descriptions of the disintegration of the armed forces as the potential for mutinies increased and the collapse in army discipline contribute to the source's usefulness, "the army is collapsing, and servile and mutinous instincts are appearing".

This, as a result of the poor conditions, combined with the radical relaxation in army discipline implemented by the Provisional Government, such as removal of the requirement to address officers by their army titles, contributed to the problems the Provisional Government faced.

Furthermore, the source's usefulness is helped by the warning of the possibility of the emergence of dictatorships, "power will pass to those who are not afraid of being harsh and cruel", which given the potential coup of the Kornilov Affair, was a distinct and real possibility faced by the Provisional Government.

This obviously came to pass in October with power taken by the Bolsheviks, who used terror and a one-party state to control the population, ruling with an iron fist, which the source does not mention, which decreases its usefulness.

In addition, the source does mention generally the general social unrest, "the country seems to be collapsing", which increases its usefulness. However, it does not give specific examples of this, which decreases its usefulness. These include the huge increase in strikes, as workers were unhappy with pay and conditions, and general social unrest, including the sometimes violent protests in the streets during the July Days, as the people protested the PG and its lack of action in dealing with the war and food shortages.

Finally, the source's usefulness is decreased by its lack of mention of the inherent weaknesses of the PG, such as dual power, which gave the soviets real power and made the PG weak.

However, the source's usefulness is hindered by its lack of explanation of the general radicalisation of the working classes at this time. The source does not mention the move leftwards, and the

Section 9 – Russia

support among workers for “All Power to the Soviets!”, a radical call for a move away from any power held by the Provisional Government to be handed over the soviets.

Likewise, the source does not mention the increase in support for the Bolshevik party, which hinders its usefulness. The Bolshevik membership increased from 10,000 to 250,000 from February to October, showing the dramatic increase in support which was a major issue facing the PG during this time, as the Bolsheviks refused to cooperate with the PG and provided a radical alternative to the government.

As Williams has argued, there was a huge radicalisation of the workers, especially in Petrograd, at this time, which the source does not mention, decreasing its usefulness. She argues that increased support for the Bolsheviks, although not necessarily desiring the one party state they implemented, was very significant and led to many moving to support them during the PG as they felt the Bolsheviks were the only party capable of achieving change.

Finally, the source does not mention Fitzpatrick’s argument that the workers themselves were increasingly radicalised, a revolution from below, setting up their own soviets and committees, which then provided an ideal platform for the Bolsheviks to begin their work. This omission decreases the source’s usefulness.

Section 9 – Russia

71. Source B provides a fairly thorough description of the bureaucratic influence on the power struggle, which explain one interpretation of Stalin's victory.

Firstly, the source describes the movement of daily politics from the Politburo, run by a few party elites e.g. Lenin, Trotsky, Kamenev, Zinoviev, Stalin, Bukharin, Tomsky, to the increased bureaucracy of the Orguburo and the Secretariat, which were heavily influenced by Stalin, "the Politburo might make decision, but it was the Orguburo and Secretariat, dominated by Stalin, which managed things on a daily basis". This increase of bureaucracy meant whoever controlled the organs of the party controlled the state, as Pipes has argued, the control of party bureaucracy gave whoever controlled it almost unlimited power.

The source also describes the introduction of many new members into the party, "the staff of (the Secretariat) increased from 30 in 1919 to 602 in 1921 and rose again to 767 in 1926". This increase of party members was repeated across the country with Stalin's 'Lenin Enrollment', designed in honour of Lenin, but gaining Stalin support across the country, using regionalism to gain power as he promoted his own supporters.

Finally, the source describes the importance of the position of General Secretary, "placing the General secretary at the heart of the 'nomenklatura system' ". This increase of importance in Stalin's position, from a simply administrator to the leader of the Soviet Union, was due to increased bureaucracy arguably introduced with the Civil War.

Structuralists, particularly Hosking and Carr generally agree with this source's view. Hosking argues that Stalin was able to grow his power in the party organs, disparagingly named "Comrade Card-Index" by his colleagues, as well as arguing that this accumulation of power was unnoticed by the other senior Bolsheviks.

Similarly, Carr argues that it was the structural changes in the party that meant that Stalin was the obvious choice as the next leader and Trotsky was doomed to fail, summarising this in, "Trotsky was a hero of the revolution. He fell when the heroic age was over".

However, the source does not mention the universal underestimation of Stalin by the party elite. This meant that Stalin was able to gain power unnoticed, until it was too late, leading to Trotsky's defeat in the leadership struggle.

Source C gives an accurate description of some of the aspects of the initial campaign against Trotsky which was led by Stalin. The source's description of the "group of seven", which "consist(ed) of all members of the Politburo except (Trotsky)" is a fairly accurate representation of the methods used by Stalin to destroy Trotsky's political career and standing.

Additionally, the formation of the triumvirate, consisting of Stalin, Zinoviev and Kamenev, managed to basically ruin Trotsky's political career by only January 1925, merely a year after Lenin's death. He was soon removed from his position as Commissar for War, and expelled from the Politburo shortly afterward. These manoeuvres by Stalin helped him to win the power struggle against Trotsky.

The source also describes the "group of seven" as "illegal", referencing the ban on factionalism brought in by Lenin. This was used against Trotsky by Stalin in the leadership struggle, accusing him of creating Trotskyism, and planning to overthrow the state.

Section 9 – Russia

However, although the source does mention, Stalin's use of turning of party members against Trotsky "it set a rule that politburo members should...all polemicize against Trotsky", it does not mention Stalin's use of this tactic in destroying other members of the party. Stalin managed to destroy all his possible competitors by having them act against each other. Firstly, the triumvirate and "group of seven" against Trotsky, secondly, using Bukharin and rightists to destroy Zinoviev and Kamenev, the other members of the triumvirate, and thirdly destroying the rightists themselves. This manipulation of the situation by Stalin contributed immensely to his win of the leadership.

Finally, the source does not mention the effect Trotsky's personality had on the leadership struggle. He was an intellectual, and often rude and arrogant which alienated many of the rank and file, as well as other leaders of the party. Indeed, had been argued to have led to the formation of the triumvirate, as Zinoviev and Kamenev saw Stalin as less of a threat than Trotsky.

Similarly, the effect of Bonapartism on the struggle was somewhat significant. As Fitzpatrick argues, the leaders were all afraid of a potential Bonaparte, a military general who would take over a revolution, "this was discussed.. often with implicit reference to Trotsky". This arguably led to many turning their support away from Trotsky to Stalin, who seemed less of a threat.

Section 9 – Russia

72. The source describes the reasons for Soviet victory to some extent. Firstly, the source describes the focus on the total war economy “the Soviet war effort focused above all on the prosecution of war at the expense of everything else”.

The centrally planned system was a significant advantage for the Soviets over the Nazis, who only transitioned to a total war economy by 1942, which helped the Soviets to win the war.

Secondly, the source describes the bringing together and resilience of the Russian people, “a real enemy...galvanised Soviet society into efforts that would have seemed all but impossible...1941”. The resilience of the Russian people was a significant factor in keeping the country running during the war.

Indeed, the people were willing to endure unimaginable losses of over 20 million casualties, in order to win the war.

In fact, McCauley argues that this “uneasy alliance” between the Soviet state and people was what won the war for Russia.

The source also mentions the patriotism of the Russian people to defend and endure hardship for “Mother Russia”. Stalin’s use of propaganda that emphasised the defence of the Russian motherland was very significant in gaining support among the Russian people.

The use of symbolic figures in propaganda e.g. Tanya, an 18 year old who stood up to German torture until death, helped to bring the Russian people together in their defence of the motherland.

Likewise, his recognition that people may not be willing to fight for him, as much for Russia, as well as his embracing of the Orthodox Church to help people get through the hardship of the war helped secure Russian victory.

Moreover, Stalin’s leadership also helped to gain Soviet victory. His rousing speeches, calling for unity and strength helped to galvanise the support of the Russian people, as well as his ruthless order 227 of “not one step back”, which used terror to enforce strength and tenacity on the Red Army as well as partisan resistance.

Furthermore, the role of Stalin as a statesman, making alliances has not been mentioned. He formed alliances, firstly the non-aggression pact with Hitler in 1939, which bought Russia significant time to build industry before the Nazi invasion. This contributed to Soviet victory.

Secondly, Stalin’s formation of the alliance with the UK and USA also helped him to gain support via Lend-Lease and to persuade the allies to open up a second front which relieved pressure on the Soviets as the Nazis had to divide their armies. This also contributed to Soviet victory.

However, the source does not mention the weaknesses of the Nazis as a reason for victory. The poor planning of the Nazis, having Operation Barbarossa delayed meant that Russia could not be conquered in one summer, which left the Nazis struggling to fight in the winter. They were unprepared for the cold, 100,000 soldiers were suffering from frostbite by winter 1941, and their fuel froze, making any advancement impossible.

Section 9 – Russia

Ward and Figes have argued that it was the weaknesses of the Nazis that led to their eventual defeat, with Ward stating that Moscow would have fallen if it had not been for the poor planning of the Nazis.

Furthermore, the source does not mention the role of the Lend Lease programme in helping Russia keep fighting. The programme provided Russia with 500,000 vehicles, and SPAM with which to feed their army, allowing their economy to focus on producing armaments, which significantly helped the Soviet victory.